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Note
DEFINING ATTEMPTS: MANDUJANO’S ERROR
MICHAEL R. FISHMAN†
ABSTRACT
The law of attempt requires a court to determine when trying to
commit a crime is, in itself, conduct that deserves criminal
punishment. Common-law courts were cautious not to push the
boundaries of attempt crimes too far, and early definitions of attempt
required that a defendant come very close to the completion of an
intended crime before he could be convicted. As Congress has
codified criminal law, it has created attempt statutes without defining
attempt, presumably believing that courts would continue to use
common-law meanings as they had always done. This is exactly what
happened until the late twentieth century, when federal courts began
to adopt a new, harsher formulation that had been proposed in the
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC). This Note
examines the strange process through which federal courts expanded
the definition of a background principle of criminal law, and argues
that they were wrong to do so. Judges who ignore such deep commonlaw roots usurp the legislature’s role in defining crimes, and create
confusion as to the true meaning of criminal statutes.

INTRODUCTION
Establishing a crime of attempt requires proving two elements:
the intent to commit a crime and some conduct toward the
1
commission of that crime. “Much ink has been spilt” by courts,
lawyers, and scholars seeking to define just how far a defendant’s
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1. EUGENE MEEHAN & JOHN H. CURRIE, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT 3–4 & n.21
(2d ed. 2000) (“As made abundantly clear in . . . American cases, mens rea and actus reus must
exist pari passu” to establish a crime of attempt.).
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conduct can progress before amounting to an attempt. The law of
attempt requires a court to distinguish the conduct of law-abiding
citizens from conduct deservedly deemed criminal. Common-law
courts developed a number of ways to resolve this quandary, all of
which required that a defendant’s conduct come very close to the
3
completion of the intended crime. After almost 200 years of
4
common-law efforts to define the crime of attempt, the American
5
Law Institute’s 1962 Model Penal Code (MPC) included a definition
of attempt intended to catch would-be wrongdoers earlier in their
6
wrongdoing. Less than ten years later, federal courts began to adopt
7
8
the MPC’s definition. By 1998, every circuit had done so. This Note
examines the unusual process by which a federal court adopted this
part of the MPC, and argues that federal courts should revise the
current interpretation of criminal attempts.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses two possible
sources of federal attempt law: the common law and the MPC’s
9
“Criminal Attempt” provision. Part II examines how federal courts
have developed the definition of attempt, argues that the courts had
no justification for adopting the MPC’s “substantial step test,” and
describes how federal courts should have conducted their analyses.
Part III argues that the erroneous application of the substantial step
test is a serious error that has created unnecessary confusion and led
to unjust outcomes.

2. Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Cunningham v. State,
49 Miss. 685, 701 (Miss. 1874) (“[The] doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is one
of the most important, and at the same time most intricate, titles of the criminal law. . . . [T]here
is no title, indeed, less understood by the courts, or more obscure in the text books, than that of
attempts.”).
3. See infra Part I (describing common-law attempt doctrines).
4. Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model
Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995) (citing R v. Scofield, (1784) Cald. 397 (K.B.),
as the first common-law attempt case).
5. Past and Present ALI Projects, AM. LAW INST. 5 (Mar. 2015), https://www.ali.org/
media/filer_public/a5/a9/a5a914ef-396a-4b28-96c5-b0dd932176a6/past_present_aliprojects.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R3ZB-JEJW].
6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962) (defining “Criminal Attempt”); AM. LAW
INST., MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES PART I, § 5.01, 331–32 (1985) (discussing the
justification for expanding attempt liability through section 5.01).
7. See United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting the
MPC’s substantial step test).
8. See infra note 111.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01.
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I. SOURCES OF ATTEMPT LAW
This Part provides an overview of attempt law in the United
States. Section A discusses the various common-law attempt
doctrines that grew out of the initial English creation of attempt as a
crime. Section B discusses the MPC’s definition of substantial step,
created by the American Law Institute as a proposed rejection of
common-law attempt jurisprudence.
A. Attempt at Common Law
The common-law crime of “attempt” required both intent to
10
commit a crime and an act in furtherance of that intent. Courts
describing the conduct requirement generally distinguished between
11
attempts and acts that were merely “preparatory.” This distinction,
12
by itself, offered little guidance when deciding a particular case.
Rather, the attempt/preparation distinction defined the question
courts were required to answer: Once a defendant decided to commit
a crime, how much conduct in furtherance of that intent was required
to convict the defendant of an attempt? Common-law courts
answered this question using three tests: proximity, probable
13
desistance, and res ipsa loquitur.
1. Proximity.
Many common-law definitions of attempt
distinguished between “preparation” and “attempt” by determining

10. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 622–23 (5th ed. 2010).
11. Id. (collecting common-law attempt cases). Although some courts find “preparatory”
acts to be sufficient, this difference rests on differing views of what conduct is “preparatory,”
rather than any substantive difference in the scope of attempt law. See id. at 622 (“Precisely
what kind of act is required is not made very clear by the language traditionally used by courts
and legislatures. It is commonly stated that more than an act of preparation must
occur . . . although the situation is confused somewhat because courts occasionally say that
preparatory acts will be enough under certain circumstances.”).
12. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950) (“The decisions
[distinguishing preparation from attempt] are too numerous to cite, and would not help much
anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no definite line . . . .”).
13. When discussing common-law definitions of attempt, this Note will often refer to state
court cases interpreting state criminal attempt statutes. Although these are not “common law”
crimes because they are codified by the legislature, many attempt provisions are so broad as to
retain all the relevant aspects of common-law offense definition. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 110.00 (McKinney 2014) (“A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with
intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such
crime.”). This broad formulation has been interpreted to incorporate the state’s common-law
attempt jurisprudence. E.g., People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Term
2013).
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how close the defendant came to completing the underlying crime.
This test sounded in the belief that criminalizing attempts could help
15
deter the harm caused by completed criminal conduct. Under almost
all common-law definitions, a defendant was guilty of an attempt if he
engaged in the “last proximate act,” that is, if he had done everything
16
he believed necessary to commit the predicate crime. Although no
17
common-law court required there to be a last proximate act,
proximity doctrines generally required the defendant’s actions to
18
“advance very near to the accomplishment of the intended crime.”
Many common-law courts used physical proximity to distinguish
attempts from preparation. Courts focused on physical proximity
would ask how close a defendant had come to “the time and place at
19
which the intended crime [was] supposed to occur.” These analyses
tended to place the boundary between attempt and preparation fairly
far along the timeline of a defendant’s activity. For example, in
20
People v. Rizzo, an influential case decided using a physical
21
proximity analysis, a man sought to rob a bank messenger carrying a
22
“pay roll.” Rizzo and his armed accomplices drove to various
locations where they thought the messenger might be found, but
23
could not find him. The police observed the behavior of Rizzo and

14. Other sources describe three distinct “tests” within the common-law proximity
approaches: the physical proximity test, the dangerous proximity test, and the indispensable
element test. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321–29; LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 623–28. For
the purposes of this Note, there need be no distinction between these tests, because they
function according to the same general principles. For example, in People v. Rizzo, the case
cited by both Professor Wayne LaFave and the Commentators as an example of the “physical
proximity test,” the court explicitly asked if the defendants’ acts came “dangerously near to” the
commission of the crime. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927). It is therefore
probably more accurate to say that physical proximity, dangerous proximity, and indispensable
element are simply different considerations within the same test.
15. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 62–63 (1881) (stating that the
purpose of punishing attempts is “to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow” if
the defendant were allowed to continue with his plan).
16. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 623–24.
17. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321 n.97 (stating that no court had ever required
the last proximate act, and refuting the notion that English courts had ever truly supported this
requirement).
18. Rizzo, 158 N.E. at 889.
19. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 625.
20. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927).
21. Id. The case continues to be cited by New York courts as a source of attempt law. E.g.,
People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Term 2013).
22. Rizzo, 158 N.E. at 888.
23. Id. at 888–89.
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his counterparts and arrested the men before they found the
24
messenger or came close to anyone in possession of a pay roll. The
New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions,
holding that they had not come physically close enough to their target
to commit an attempt, just as a man who “armed himself and started
out to find the person whom he had planned to kill” would not be
25
guilty of attempted murder if he could not find his intended target.
26
In Commonwealth v. Peaslee, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, employed a “dangerous
27
proximity” analysis to distinguish between attempts and preparation.
The dangerous proximity test considered a number of factors,
including the gravity of the attempted offense, the nearness of the
defendant to completing the crime, and the probability that the
28
defendant’s acts would result in the commission of the crime.
Relying on an imprecise multifactor test instead of a bright-line rule,
however, created an unforgiving test for prosecutors. In Peaslee, the
court held that a defendant’s conduct was insufficient for a conviction
of attempted arson when the defendant had: (1) created a pile of
“combustibles . . . in such a way that . . . if lighted would have set fire
29
to the building”; (2) offered to pay an employee to light the
combustibles using a candle already placed in the same room; and (3)
30
drove that employee some distance toward the building. Despite the
defendant’s extensive and unequivocal conduct, he had not
completed an attempt because he lacked “a present intent to
accomplish the crime without much delay,” and did not have “[the]
intent at a time and place where he was able to” complete the
31
planned crime.
Courts applying proximity approaches sometimes distinguished
attempts from preparation by asking whether the defendant had
gained control of all elements that were “indispensable” to

24. Id.
25. Id. at 889.
26. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.).
27. Id. at 55. Peaslee continues to be controlling law in Massachusetts, and was cited as
recently as 2009 in Commonwealth v. Bell, 917 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Mass. 2009).
28. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897) (Holmes, J.). Peaslee
referred to Kennedy for the proposition that the proximity test includes the consideration of
multiple factors to determine the requisite dangerous proximity. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 56.
29. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 55.
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. at 57.
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commission of the crime. Under this approach, if condition X must
exist before the defendant can commit his intended crime, there can
33
be no attempt before condition X exists. Justice Holmes referenced
this rule in Peaslee by holding that the defendant must have intended
to commit the crime “at a time and place where he was able to carry it
34
out.” In common-law opinions, the indispensable condition took
35
various forms, including the cooperation of a third party, the
36
37
possession of contraband, or the possession of a weapon.
Proximity tests had two important features in common. First, as
indicated by cases like Peaslee and Rizzo, these tests precluded
prosecution of attempters who were not very close to achieving their
criminal goals. Second, all proximity tests asked how far the
defendant was from completing an intended crime, rather than
looking to how much the defendant had done in pursuit of a criminal
38
intent.
2. Probable Desistance. Under the common-law probable
desistance test, a defendant’s actions constituted attempts, and not
mere preparation, if “in the ordinary and natural course of events,
without interruption from an outside source, [they] would result in
39
the crime intended.” Courts determined probability of desistance
through an objective test: whether any person who had gone as far as
40
the defendant would likely stop before completing the crime. For
example, in one case using the probable desistance test, the court held
that a defendant who fashioned “tools adapted to jailbreaking” had
not yet moved his attempt beyond “abeyance” and therefore could
41
not be found guilty of attempted escape from jail. Although this test
was well tailored to punishing only those criminal actors who are truly

32. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323–24 (describing the “Indispensable Element
Approach”).
33. Id.
34. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 57 (emphasis added).
35. State v. Block, 62 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. 1933).
36. United States v. Stephens, 12 F. 52, 56 (C.C.D. Or. 1882).
37. State v. Wood, 103 N.W. 25, 26 (S.D. 1905).
38. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing “what
remains to be done” as the “chief concern of the [common-law] proximity tests”).
39. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324 (citing cases which followed the probable
desistance test).
40. Id. at 324–25.
41. State v. Hurley, 64 A. 78, 79 (Vt. 1906).
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42

dangerous, it was entirely impracticable. On what basis can anyone
43
know the probability of another’s future actions? In practice, courts
44
do not seek to read a defendant’s mind. Instead, the test functioned
as a reworded proximity approach, under the theory that a person
who had come very close to committing a crime would be unlikely to
45
turn back.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur. The res ipsa loquitur test required that a
46
defendant’s conduct unambiguously demonstrate criminal intent.
Under this test, purchasing a pen with plans to commit forgery, or
even purchasing a hunting rifle with plans to commit a murder, would
have been an insufficient act to support an attempt conviction
47
because such acts are of an equivocal or “ambiguous nature.” As
was true for all common-law tests, the res ipsa loquitur test excluded
from attempt liability a wide range of actions taken in pursuit of a
criminal intent. This was by design, as the test was most concerned
with the “firmer state of mind” that exists once someone “perform[s]
48
acts that he realizes would incriminate him.” This test has been
49
described as the “stop the film” test, because it looked at the
defendant’s actions as though viewed on a silent film, without the
50
defendant’s confession or other statement of intent. This test made
convictions more difficult to obtain because it focused exclusively on
51
the defendant’s acts toward commission of the crime. A confession
of intent to commit a crime could not be considered when
52
determining whether the defendant’s conduct spoke for itself.

42. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324–25 (describing the probable desistence test as
“[o]riented largely toward the dangerousness of the actor’s conduct”).
43. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (explaining criticisms of the probable desistance
test).
44. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 325.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 326–29 (describing the res ipsa loquitur test); LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626–
28 (same).
47. People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Mich. 1957).
48. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.
49. State v. Stewart, 420 N.W.2d 44, 50 (Wis. 1988).
50. J.W. Cecil Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 230, 237–38 (1933).
51. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 627–28.
52. Id.
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B. The MPC’s Definition of Attempt: Section 5.01
53

The MPC, promulgated in 1962 by the American Law Institute,
included a general attempt provision in section 5.01, “Criminal
54
Attempt.” The MPC provided three avenues through which
55
prosecutors could establish attempt liability. Two overlapped with
common-law definitions, essentially requiring the defendant to
perform the last proximate act toward the completion of the predicate
56
crime. In the third category, the MPC’s definition deviated from the
common law, requiring that the defendant take only a “substantial
57
step” toward the completion of the underlying offense. A substantial
step must be “strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal
58
purpose.” Although the definition of substantial step “retain[ed] the
element of imprecision found in most of the [common-law]
59
approaches to the preparation-attempt problem,” it provided some
guidance by listing examples of conduct that, if strongly corroborative
60
of criminal purpose, would not be insufficient as a matter of law.
The substantial step test’s most significant feature was its
61
expansion of attempt liability beyond the common law’s standards.
Many of the examples of conduct listed by the MPC as sufficient to
prove a substantial step include conduct that would have been
62
insufficient at common law. For example “searching for . . . the

53. Past and Present ALI Projects, supra note 5. The American Law Institute is an
“independent organization” devoted to “producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and
improve the law.” About ALI, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali [http://perma.cc/
3HTR-EMAW].
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962).
55. Id.
56. See id. § 5.01(1)(a) (encompassing “conduct that would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as [the defendant] believes them to be”); id. § 5.01(1)(b)
(applying only to result crimes, encompassing conduct done “with the purpose of causing or
with the belief that it will cause [the criminal] result without further conduct on [the
defendant’s] part”).
57. Id. § 5.01(1)(c).
58. Id. § 5.01(2). The authors of the Code believed that this would expand the scope of
attempt law, writing: “It is expected, in the normal case, that this approach will broaden the
scope of attempt liability [compared to the proximity approaches]. . . . [T]he requirement of
proving a substantial step generally will prove less of a hurdle for the prosecution than the res
ipsa loquitur approach . . . .” AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–30.
59. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2).
61. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 628 (describing the Model Penal Code’s rejection of
common-law attempt doctrines).
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (listing examples).
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contemplated victim of the crime” would have been conduct sufficient
63
to prove an attempt under the substantial step test, in contrast to
common-law cases like Rizzo, in which such conduct would have
64
been insufficient as a matter of law. The would-be arsonist whose
actions were held preparatory in Peaslee would also face conviction
under the Code’s test, which included the “collection . . . of materials
to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place
contemplated for its commission, where such . . . collection . . . serves
65
no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances.” Unlike the
probable desistance test, the substantial step test would apply
regardless of the probability that a particular defendant would desist;
unlike the res ipsa loquitur test, it would not require the defendant’s
actions to unequivocally indicate criminal intent.
The MPC’s Commentaries acknowledged that the substantial
step formulation would broaden attempt liability beyond the scope of
66
common-law attempt doctrines. This broader definition was
included in the MPC itself to facilitate the “apprehension of [certain]
dangerous persons” and allow law enforcement to intervene earlier to
reduce the risk of harm caused by the criminal conduct “without
providing [the] immunity” from prosecution that the offender would
67
enjoy under common-law approaches.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL ATTEMPT LAW
This Part discusses how federal courts have defined the act
requirement of federal attempt crimes. Section A begins by discussing
the current consensus, to the extent that one exists, that has formed
around the MPC’s substantial step test. Section B discusses how the
courts arrived at this consensus, and the influence of United States v.
68
Mandujano on the development of federal attempt jurisprudence.
Section C analyzes Mandujano, arguing that it was wrongly decided
because it failed to follow traditional methods for interpreting
statutory language with a common-law background. Section C also
describes an alternate analysis for cases like Mandujano that would

63. Id. § 5.01(2)(a).
64. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889–90 (N.Y. 1927).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(f).
66. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–31 (describing how the substantial step test
would reach more conduct than the common-law tests).
67. Id. at 331.
68. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974).
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allow courts to arrive at a more defensible definition for federal
attempts.
A. The Status of Federal Attempt Law
69

Federal criminal law includes no general attempt provision,
70
71
unlike many state codes, the MPC, and the Uniform Code of
72
Military Justice. Liability for attempt to commit a federal crime
73
exists only when Congress has explicitly criminalized an attempt.
Although the word “attempt” appears many times throughout the
74
federal law’s various criminal provisions, federal law does not define
75
the term.
Defining the conduct element of attempt crimes, federal courts
have “rather uniformly adopted the standard found in [s]ection 5.01
76
of the American Law Institute’s MPC.” That is, courts have held
that an attempt requires only a substantial step toward committing
77
the substantive crime. Most federal appellate courts have included
the Code’s requirement that a substantial step “strongly
78
corroborat[e]” the defendant’s criminal purpose.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1314 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]o attempt a
federal crime is not, of itself, a federal crime.”); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 185 (3d
Cir. 1973) (“Federal criminal law is purely statutory; there is no federal common law of
crimes.”).
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 777.04 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 274, 6 (2014); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 110.00 (McKinney 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-104 (2014).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962).
72. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2012).
73. United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A]ttempt is actionable
only where a specific criminal statute outlaws both its actual as well as its attempted violation.”).
74. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(c) (2012) (prohibiting attempts to kill the President of the United
States or certain other members of the executive branch); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (containing
an attempt provision for Hobbs Act robbery and extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2012) (containing
an attempt provision for conduct of certain illegal sexual activity through channels of interstate
commerce); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012) (containing an attempt provision for a number of drug
crimes).
75. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is no
comprehensive statutory definition of attempt in federal law.” (quoting United States v. Heng
Awkak Roman, 356 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1973))).
76. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d at 869; United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 1982).
For a list of the cases by which circuit courts have adopted this test, see infra note 111.
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
78. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841; United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1980);
Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376; see also United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1320 (10th
Cir. 1979) (quoting Mandujano for its use of the “strongly corroborative” standard, but basing
its conclusion on the requirement of an “overt act pointed directly to the commission of the
crime charged”).
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B. The Development of Federal Attempt Law
The current interpretation of the conduct required to prove an
attempt in federal law is derived almost entirely from the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mandujano. Although a number
of earlier federal cases addressed the distinction between attempts
79
and preparation, the present consensus derives directly from
80
Mandujano.
Roy Mandujano’s conviction for an attempt to distribute heroin
arose from his interactions with an undercover narcotics officer who
81
was pretending to search for drugs to purchase. Mandujano asked
82
the officer “if he was looking for ‘stuff,’” and the officer said he was.
Mandujano indicated that he had access to a certain type of heroin for
83
a specific price, if the officer could wait. The officer said he could
84
not. Mandujano said he could procure the heroin immediately from
85
a contact if the officer provided money “out front.” The officer gave
the money to Mandujano, who left in an apparent attempt to locate
86
the contact. After about an hour, Mandujano returned, said he could
87
not find the contact, and gave back the officer’s money. Mandujano
said he could procure the heroin if the officer called him an hour and
88
a half later. The officer left, but when he called Mandujano’s phone
number at the designated time, someone else answered the phone
89
and said that Mandujano was unavailable. The officer had no further
90
contact with Mandujano before his arrest. At trial, a jury found

79. E.g., United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1973); Mims v. United
States, 375 F.2d 135, 148, 149 n.41 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d
Cir. 1950); Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1940); Heng Awkak Roman, 356
F. Supp. at 437, aff’d, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Butler, 204 F. Supp. 339, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Robles, 185 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1960); United States v.
De Bolt, 253 F. 78, 81 (S.D. Ohio 1918).
80. See infra notes 101–11 and accompanying text (describing the post-Mandujano
development of attempt law).
81. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 371.
82. Id. at 371.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 371.
86. Id. at 371–72.
87. Id. at 372.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Mandujano guilty of an attempt to distribute heroin in violation of 21
91
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
On appeal, Mandujano argued that the evidence showed only
92
preparation, not an attempt, to distribute heroin. The court had to
determine the scope of the word “attempt” as used in § 846, an
attempt provision for a variety of drug crimes. The court began its
analysis by noting “there is no legislative history indicating exactly
what Congress meant when it used the word ‘attempt’ in section
93
846.” The court then discussed federal cases that had grappled with
94
the limits of attempt. Mandujano cited a number of federal cases
95
that explicitly relied upon state decisions using common-law tests.
The Fifth Circuit, however, made no effort to determine whether it
should define attempt according to its common-law meaning. Instead,
the court wrote that “[a]lthough the . . . [federal] cases give somewhat
varying verbal formulations, careful examination reveals fundamental
96
agreement about what conduct will constitute a criminal attempt.”
According to the “fundamental agreement,” a defendant has
committed an attempt if, acting with the mental state required for the
underlying crime, the defendant takes a “substantial step toward
97
commission of the crime.” In a footnote, the court acknowledged
that its “definition is generally consistent with and [its] language is in
98
fact close to” the MPC’s definition of attempt. Holding that
Mandujano’s conduct constituted a substantial step toward the
99
distribution of heroin, the court affirmed his conviction.
After Mandujano, other circuit courts followed the Fifth in
adopting the MPC’s “substantial step” test, explicitly or implicitly
relying upon Mandujano’s reasoning. The Seventh Circuit, a year
after Mandujano, adopted that case’s substantial step test in United
100
States v. Green with no explanation for why Mandujano’s reasoning

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 372–76.
95. See id. at 372–76 (citing, inter alia, cases that relied upon the dangerous proximity test,
including United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 632–33 (2d Cir. 1950), and Gregg v. United
States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1940)).
96. Id. at 376.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 377 n.66.
99. Id. at 379–80.
100. United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1975).
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was persuasive. In United States v Stallworth, the Second Circuit
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s standard noting that Mandujano’s rule was
103
“properly derived from the writings of many distinguished jurists.”
However, in support of that contention, Stallworth cited opinions that
used common-law approaches to attempt based on proximity rather
104
than approaches similar to that of the MPC.
Shortly after Stallworth, the Second Circuit solidified its adoption
105
of the MPC’s test in United States v. Jackson, citing the text of
section 5.01 in its entirety and extensively quoting to the Code’s
106
Commentaries to section 5.01. Though Mandujano and Stallworth
had suggested that the substantial step test was merely “generally
107
consistent with” the MPC’s, having been “derived from the writings
108
of many distinguished jurists” such as Cardozo and Holmes,
Jackson acknowledged that Mandujano’s test had been “derived in
109
large part from the MPC’s standard.” The court did not explain why
the MPC should be used to define a federal crime.
In 1979, the Tenth Circuit adopted Mandujano’s test, reasoning
only that the Fifth Circuit in that case had “summarize[d] virtually all
of the federal cases on the subject, and although some of them stated
the requirement of overt act in somewhat different terms, the
110
standard in most instances was virtually the same.” Over the next
two decades, every circuit adopted Mandujano’s substantial step test;
however, none explained why it had adopted the MPC’s definition of
an attempt beyond a citation to the circuits that had already done
111
so.
101. See id. at 1072 (laying out the test and concluding that it “was clearly met in this case”).
102. United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 1040.
104. See id. at 1040 n.4 (“According to [Justice] Cardozo, a suspect’s conduct must ‘carry the
project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end . . . .’” (quoting People v.
Werblow, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (N.Y. 1925))).
105. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).
106. Id. at 117–20.
107. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974),
108. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040.
109. Jackson, 560 F.2d at 120.
110. United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1320 (10th Cir. 1979).
111. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model Penal
Code . . . test for attempt because it is consistent with our own caselaw and with the great weight
of modern precedent.”); United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (using
Mandujano’s substantial step test); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984)
(discussing Mandujano and section 5.01 in detail, and using the substantial step test); United
States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing every circuit which had adopted
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C. Criticism of Mandujano and its Progeny
This line of attempt cases demonstrates that, if Mandujano’s
holding was incorrect, then the widespread case law defining criminal
attempts according to the MPC’s substantial step test should be
reevaluated.
1. Mandujano’s Analysis. The cases Mandujano cited were not
dispositive of the definition of an attempt. Many were district court
112
cases, and none were binding upon the Fifth Circuit. Further, the
113
court’s claim that the cases revealed “fundamental agreement” was
an overstatement. Indeed, the cases cited revealed a fundamental
disagreement. For example, in support of the conclusion that a
“substantial step” must be “strongly corroborative of the firmness of
114
the defendant’s criminal intent,” the court cited federal cases
covering the full range of possible stances on the corroboration
115
question, from a case that required no corroboration to one that
116
required that the act unequivocally demonstrate criminal purpose.
When explaining its use of the phrase “substantial step” as opposed
117
to “overt act,” the Mandujano court said only that this language was
meant to separate the conduct of attempt from “remote
the substantial step test); United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983)
(citing only Mandujano); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting
numerous cases, including Mandujano); United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982)
(citing every circuit which had adopted the substantial step test); United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d
186, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing every circuit which had adopted the substantial step test).
112. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372–76 (citing six circuit court cases and six district court
cases).
113. Id. at 376.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing United States v. Robles, 184 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1960), for the
definition of an attempt as requiring the de minimis standard of “[a]ny effort or endeavor to
effect the act” without any reference to a corroboration requirement).
116. See id. at 377 (citing Mims v. United States, 374 F.2d 135, 148 n.40 (5th Cir. 1967), for
the proposition that mere corroboration is insufficient: “there must be some appreciable
fragment of the crime . . . the act must not be equivocal in nature”).
117. Some of the federal attempt cases cited by Mandujano used the “overt act”
formulation. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372–74 (citing United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177,
1182 (7th Cir. 1973); Lemke v. United States, 211 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1954); Wooldridge v.
United States, 237 F. 775, 778–79 (9th Cir. 1916); United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 685
(S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. De Bolt, 253 F. 78, 80 (S.D. Ohio 1918)). By themselves, the
words “overt act” would seem to indicate that any conduct, even preparation, would be
sufficient to establish an attempt. However, the cases make clear that an “overt act” must still
proceed beyond preparation. See, e.g., Wooldridge, 237 F. at 779 (applying the rule that an overt
act “must be some act directed toward the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Taylor, 84 P. 82, 83 (Or. 1906)).
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118

preparation.” But the cases cited in Mandujano did not agree that
attempts encompassed everything except remote preparation; the two
cases Mandujano directly cited for this point relied upon common-law
119
proximity analyses.
Regardless of the Mandujano court’s reasoning, its holding
required leaving behind traditional common-law definitions of
attempt in favor of the MPC’s substantial step test. Mandujano’s
conduct certainly would have failed to establish an attempt under the
120
strict proximity approaches. He would not have moved beyond
preparation under an “indispensable element” analysis because he
never gained possession of the heroin he was “attempting” to
121
distribute. The evidence showed that Mandujano searched for, but
never found, the heroin he was attempting to distribute, mirroring the
122
failure of the defendant’s preparatory acts in Rizzo. Like the
defendant in Peaslee, Mandujano never possessed an “intent [to
distribute the heroin] at a time and place where he was able to carry it
123
out.” Although the “probable desistance” test may have been
124
difficult to apply in a large number of cases, this case is not one of
them. There was no need to ask whether desistance was probable,
because Mandujano actually gave up his initial attempt to secure the
heroin, and was unwilling to engage in further conversation with his
125
intended customer.
It is arguable that Mandujano’s conduct moved beyond
preparation under a res ipsa loquitur analysis on the theory that the
act of agreeing to locate and sell the heroin “can have no other
126
purpose than” distribution of the heroin. Such an analysis misses
other potential motivations. For example, Mandujano could have

118. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 377.
119. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.)); Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687, 690
(8th Cir. 1940) (quoting People v. Werblow, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.)).
120. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing the scope and limitations of the proximity approaches).
121. See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text (discussing the indispensable-element
approach).
122. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (discussing Rizzo).
123. See Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 57.
124. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323 (describing the test as “unacceptable as a
working rationale”); LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (repeating with approval the criticism of the
probable desistance approach that “there exists no basis for making such judgments as when
desistance is no longer probable or when the normal citizen would stop”).
125. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. Turner, supra note 50, at 237–38.
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been trying to scam a naive customer out of money the customer was
willing to pay “out front.” Further, Mandujano provides no indication
that the Fifth Circuit intended to adopt, or even seriously consider,
the res ipsa loquitur test. The court mentioned the test only once, in a
footnote summarizing the MPC Commentators’ review of common127
law doctrines. None of the cases upon which Mandujano relied used
the res ipsa loquitur test. The fact that Mandujano’s conduct might
have satisfied the res ipsa loquitur test should not indicate that
Mandujano stood for something other than a full adoption of the
128
Code’s substantial step test.
2. Statutory Interpretation Analysis of Mandujano. The court in
Mandujano stated that there was “no legislative history indicating
exactly what Congress meant when it used the word ‘attempt’” in the
129
relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846. The statute contained an attempt
130
provision but neither § 846 nor any other federal statute defines
131
attempt. Without the benefit of a statutory definition or legislative
history, the court sought to cobble together a definition from the
decisions of federal circuit and district courts, and ultimately the
132
MPC. In doing so, the court failed to consider the common-law
meaning of “attempt,” which should have guided its analysis.
As the Third Circuit has explained, “[i]t is . . . well settled that
when a federal statute uses a term known to the common law to
designate a common law offense and does not define that term, courts

127. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 373 n.5.
128. However, perhaps this fact explains why the Fifth Circuit was willing, two years after
Mandujano, to employ a version of the res ipsa loquitur test in United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d
881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]e demand that . . . the objective acts performed, without any
reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature.”).
129. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372.
130. The statute punished “[a]ny person who attempts . . . to commit any” of the drugrelated offenses contained in Subchapter I, Title 21, Chapter 13 of the United States Code.
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).
131. United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[N]owhere in federal
law is there a comprehensive statutory definition of attempt.”); United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d
838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is no comprehensive statutory definition of attempt in federal
law.”). It is worth noting that these statements are technically incorrect. There is a statutory
definition of attempt in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Uniform Code of Military Justice
art. 80(a), 10 U.S.C. § 880(a) (2012); see Robert E. Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal
Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and How Military Law Can Provide One, 17
U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2010) (describing this provision).
132. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 371–74.
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called upon to construe it should apply the common-law meaning.”
The term “attempt” was known to the common law; attempt crimes
134
were recognized by early Roman law codes; and in English common
135
law the crime dates back to 1784. Distinguished American jurists,
such as Justices Holmes and Cardozo developed the common law of
136
attempt when they sat on state supreme courts. The drafters of the
MPC extensively catalogued the common-law interpretation of
attempt when explaining why the Code rejected common-law
137
approaches.
Although there are a few exceptions to the general rule of
applying common-law meaning, they do not apply to the common law
of attempt. One exception applies when the “history and purposes” of
a particular statute provide “grounds for inferring [an] affirmative
138
instruction” to deviate from a common-law definition. Another
applies when common-law rules have become so unworkable that
139
Congress could not have intended to adopt them.
The “history and purposes” exception would require a statuteby-statute analysis and would be wholly inapplicable to any statute in
which the language of “attempt” was introduced before the MPC had
140
been drafted and widely circulated. Because there is no legislative
history whatsoever indicating what Congress intended by the word
141
“attempt,” there can be no affirmative inference that Congress
intended to deviate from the word’s traditional common-law
meaning.

133. United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1941); see also Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (suggesting that “[c]ongressional silence as to . . . elements in an
Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in
common law” may warrant an inference that Congress intended to adopt the common-law
definition).
134. MEEHAN & CURRIE, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing the history of attempt crimes).
135. Brodie, supra note 4, at 238 (citing R v. Scofield, (1784) Cald. 397 (K.B.)).
136. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.); People v. Werblow,
148 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.).
137. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321–29.
138. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263–73.
139. See United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904–06 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining how the
doctrine of impossibility became unworkable and “a source of utter frustration” (quoting
United States v. Thomas, 32 C.M.R. 278, 288 (C.M.A. 1962))).
140. E.g., Hobbs Act, Pub. L. 80-772, § 1951, 62 Stat. 683, 793–94 (1948) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)).
141. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Indeed, the opposite may be the case, as indicated by the
142
occasional use of the word “endeavor” in criminal statutes. Courts
have interpreted the word “endeavor” as “connot[ing] a somewhat
143
lower threshold of purposeful activity than ‘attempt.’” In United
144
States v. Russell, the Supreme Court accepted a broad definition of
145
“endeavor” when interpreting an obstruction-of-justice statute. The
Court was persuaded by legislative history that indicated Congress’s
intention to “g[e]t rid of the technicalities which might be urged as
146
besetting the word ‘attempt’” by using the word “endeavor.” The
Court’s interpretation reinforces that the word “attempt” has
traditionally been read to include certain “technicalities” that limited
147
its scope. When Congress used “endeavor” it gave prosecutors free
rein but when Congress used “attempt” it adopted the common law’s
limitations. This makes any argument for an affirmative instruction to
construe “attempt” more broadly than at common law even less
plausible.
Nevertheless, one court identified an affirmative legislative
instruction to deviate from the common law based on the history and
purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provided an attempt provision for a
148
wide range of drug offenses. According to the Sixth Circuit in
149
United States v. Reeves, Congress’s intent in fashioning the attempt
provision was unquestionably broad, and designed to “eliminate
150
technical obstacles” to law enforcement and prosecution. Reeves

142. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (punishing endeavors to influence jurors or court
officials); 18 U.S.C. § 2192 (2012) (punishing endeavors to incite mutiny on a United States
ship).
143. United States v. Lazzerini, 611 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit held that
an endeavor included even “experimental approaches” to committing the underlying offense.
Overton v. United States, 403 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1968).
144. United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921).
145. Id. at 143.
146. Id.
147. Id. For example, the Court held that defendants could not avail themselves of the
common-law defense of impossibility when charged with an endeavor to commit a substantive
crime. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (citing Russell, 255 U.S. at 143).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Though other courts deviated from the common law by
adopting the MPC’s substantial step test, they did not do so based on a perceived congressional
instruction. See supra Part II.B.
149. United States v. Reeves, 794 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1986).
150. Id. at 1104 (“[T]here can be no question that the Congressional intent in fashioning the
attempt provision as part of an all-out effort to reach all acts and activities related to the drug
traffic was all inclusive and calculated to eliminate technical obstacles confronting law
enforcement . . . .”).
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relied on another court’s statement that the statute “makes it
apparent that Congress . . . intended to encompass every act and
activity which could lead to a proliferation of drug traffic. Nothing in
the statute indicates any congressional intent to limit the reach of this
151
legislation, which is described in its very title as ‘Comprehensive.’”
This logic is tenuous at best, essentially asserting that because
Congress criminalized a broad range of activity courts should extend
the statute whenever reasonably possible. The reverse could just as
easily be inferred from the same legislative history: Congress
specified a broad range of activity to criminalize, which it found to be
“[c]omprehensive,” and therefore any activity not unambiguously
included in the statute was not meant to be criminalized. Surprisingly,
despite finding an affirmative instruction to read the statute more
broadly, the court also referred to one of the narrow common-law
152
formulations of attempt, a version of the res ipsa loquitur test.
Courts are also willing to deviate from common-law definitions
without an explicit legislative instruction when the common-law
153
definitions are burdened by “hair-splitting”
or “unworkable
154
distinctions.”
Whatever confusion might have accompanied
common-law attempt jurisprudence, there is no indication that
common-law act requirements were ever so unworkable that
Congress could not possibly have meant to adopt them. That level of
unworkability is reserved for cases like the impossibility defense to
attempt, an area of law “fraught with intricacies and artificial
distinctions,” and described as “an illusory test leading to
155
contradictory, and sometimes absurd, results.”
By contrast,
common-law formulations of attempt’s conduct requirement continue
to be the law in some jurisdictions, where judges presumably find
156
their standards workable. Although the MPC’s drafters rejected the

151. Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1979)).
152. See id. (applying the rule that a defendant’s acts must, by themselves, “mark the
defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature”).
153. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1980).
154. United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904–05 (3d Cir. 1983).
155. State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J. 1968).
156. Massachusetts continues to use the proximity analysis codified in Peaslee. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Bell, 917 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Mass. 2009). New York similarly continues to rely
on Rizzo and the common-law proximity analysis. E.g., People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687,
689 (N.Y. App. Term 2013).
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common-law tests, they did so due to policy considerations, not a
157
belief that the common-law tests were unworkable.
Analyzing the word “attempt” according to its common-law
meaning poses a challenge because the word had multiple meanings
158
at common law. If federal courts should define attempt according to
the common law, should they use a proximity approach, the res ipsa
loquitur test, or the probable desistance test? To begin, the answer is
not “the MPC.” The existence of multiple common-law definitions of
attempt did not give courts license to apply a definition unknown to
the common law. When multiple common-law meanings exist at the
time a statute was drafted, “it [is] more appropriate to inquire which
of the common-law readings of the term best accords with the overall
159
purposes of the statute.” The Mandujano court and the circuits that
followed did not inquire which common-law definition of attempt
best fit the purposes of the predicate statutes, but instead adopted a
uniform standard across all attempt statutes that was substantially
160
different from any common-law definition.
3. Conducting the Appropriate Analysis. Well-established tools
of statutory interpretation should guide any court faced with a statute
containing an attempt provision. That is, the court should attempt to
ascertain legislative intent as embodied in the language of the
particular statute. This analysis may be problematic in that it requires
the courts to accept as true certain fictions: that a given legislature
possessed an unstated intent for the law’s meaning, or that a
deliberative body made up of multiple people can even have an
161
intent. By asking what the enacting legislature intended, judges
must essentially read the minds of past legislators with few tools to

157. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–31 (discussing the policy considerations
guiding the Code’s rejection of common-law tests in favor of the substantial step test).
158. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 622–28.
159. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990); see also United States v. Turley, 352
U.S. 407, 411–13 (1957) (stating that, if Congress uses a term with multiple common-law
meanings in a criminal statute, the term should be interpreted according to the meaning which is
supported by the term’s historic usage as well as the purpose of the law and its legislative
history).
160. See supra Part I.B (discussing the differences between the substantial step test and
common-law tests).
161. See Eric A. Johnson, Dynamic Incorporation of the General Part: Criminal Law’s
Missing (Hyper)Link, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1831, 1869–76 (2015) (criticizing the use of
statutory interpretation techniques that focus on a legislature’s intent).
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162

guide them. Further, courts may be put in the position of claiming
to “discover” the answer to questions of law that could not have
163
existed during the time of the enacting legislature.
A statutory interpretation analysis that focuses on the common
law as it existed at the time of a statute’s enactment can perhaps be
164
best justified as a default rule. Courts interpreting statutes will
eventually be forced to apply default rules; the alternative would be
165
to fill legislative gaps with personal policy judgments. “Normally,
this will (and does) dictate applying some form of default rule that
166
estimates the preferences of the enacting or current government.”
An interpretation that is ascertained by use of a default rule “must be
within the range of plausible statutory meanings” in order to be fair
167
and effective. Legislators cannot be said to legislate ex ante around
the application of a default rule if they do not know what the default
rule will be.
Some theories of default rules suggest that statutes should be
construed to elicit legislative response, rather than to reflect
168
legislative preferences.
The general concept is that courts
interpreting ambiguous statutory language should interpret the
169
statute in a way that discourages ambiguity. Even those theories,
however, do not “justify adopting interpretations that parties were
entitled to assume lay outside the range of possible statute
170
meanings.” In the case of attempt provisions enacted before the
MPC, all relevant parties were perfectly entitled to assume that such
provisions would not be interpreted according to some yet-unknown
definition of attempt. They would have been particularly unable to
guess that the novel interpretation did not come from judges, but

162. See id. at 1874 (describing how static incorporation may be “extraordinarily complex”).
163. See id. (explaining that, for crimes that did not exist when Congress adopted a
particular statute, “[t]he Court probably would have been pretending, then, if it had claimed to
‘discover’ a definitive answer in the judge-made law”).
164. See generally Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 2162, 2254 (2002) (describing the use of default rules in statutory interpretation).
165. Id. at 2164–65.
166. Id. at 2165.
167. Id. at 2170.
168. Id. The rationale behind these theories is that courts should interpret ambiguous
statutory language in a way that discourages ambiguity. Id. at 2169–70.
169. Id. at 2169–71.
170. Id.
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rather from the American Law Institute, an unelected private group
171
that proposed substantial changes to state criminal law codes.
An analysis that focuses on the meaning of the statute’s text
should therefore govern the interpretation of the conduct
requirement for attempts. That meaning can be best ascertained by
reference to the common law. Under this analysis, courts would
choose one of the common-law approaches: proximity, probable
desistance, or res ipsa loquitur. Choosing among these approaches
presents two questions. First, should the meaning of attempt be
uniform across the criminal law, or might each attempt provision be
interpreted differently? Second, how should courts determine which
of the common-law approaches “best accords with the overall
172
purposes” of attempt law generally, or of any particular attempt
provision specifically?
a. How Many Definitions of Attempt? When Congress uses the
same word in multiple statutes, courts do not necessarily assume that
173
its carries over across statutes. Although no court has stated that the
definition of attempt may vary from statute to statute, one has
considered the context of a particular statute when interpreting an
174
attempt provision. It seems to be the common practice for courts to
175
assume that attempts are the same across federal criminal statutes.

171. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MODEL PENAL CODE 3, https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf [http://
perma.cc/UH34-XK2D] (“When the Institute undertook its work on criminal law, however, it
judged the existing law too chaotic and irrational to merit ‘restatement.’ What was needed, the
Institute concluded, was a model code, which states might use to draft new criminal codes.”).
172. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“Most
words have different shades of meaning, and consequently may be variously construed, not only
when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even
the same section.”). But see Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 155
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (interpreting the word “requirements” by reference to its use in other statutes).
174. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Reeves, 794
F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1986)).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 373–76 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting and
analyzing cases that interpreted attempt under various statutes); United States v. McFadden,
739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying Mandujano’s standard to an attempt provision in a
bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)); United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187–88 (9th Cir.
1980) (applying Mandujano’s test to an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, under 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
without explaining why the definition of attempt should be transferrable); United States v.
Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1319–20 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying Mandujano’s standard to an
attempt provision in a statute that prohibited attempting to damage property involved in
interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 844, and treating definitions of attempt as transferrable across
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That Congress has consistently declined to define attempt by
statute indicates that the definition of attempt should apply generally
rather than on a statute-by-statute basis. Without any internal
reference, the definition of attempt must come from outside the
statutory text, from some broader idea of attempt law that Congress
understood as contained within the word “attempt.” Assuming
Congress intended for attempt to have any meaning at all, only one
source could have provided that meaning when attempt provisions
were first enacted: the common law of attempt. By consistently
referring to attempt without defining the term, Congress suggests that
attempt law exists apart from statutory definition, and that each usage
refers to the same root concept. The common law is the only viable
“root.”
When Congress intends for the act requirement of a generally
applicable criminal provision to vary across statutes, it may say so.
Courts have held that this is what Congress did for federal conspiracy
176
provisions.
In 1948, Congress enacted a general conspiracy
provision for the federal law under which liability would not be
imposed unless “one or more of [the conspirators] do any act to effect
177
the object of the conspiracy.” This was a deviation from the
common law of conspiracies, which held that “a conspiracy was
punishable even though no act was done beyond the mere making of
178
the agreement.” When Congress subsequently enacted conspiracy
provisions for individual crimes that punished only “conspiracies”
without including the additional act requirement in the statute’s text,
courts inferred an affirmative legislative instruction to apply the
broader common-law act requirement to the conspiracies Congress
179
had singled out. There are no comparable signals from Congress
that it intended the act requirement of attempt provisions to vary
across statutes.
Another approach that supports a uniform interpretation of
attempt provisions is the belief that Congress would never have
intended to make a fundamental change in the nature of attempt law
without saying so explicitly. The Supreme Court has referred to this
statutes); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying Mandujano’s
standard to an attempt provision in a bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).
176. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 661.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
178. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 661.
179. See id. (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1947); Singer v. United States, 323
U.S. 338 (1945); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)).
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Before the MPC was
idea as the “dog that didn’t bark.”
promulgated, attempt crimes were defined exclusively by the common
law. Had Congress ever intended to define one particular attempt
provision differently from all others, it surely would have said so. But
Congress has never given any indication that it intended to change
the meaning of attempt. Indeed, when Congress did intend to punish
activity that was similar to attempt while avoiding the common-law
181
rules that limited the scope of liability, it used the word “endeavor.”
Therefore, if courts seek to interpret the elements of attempt
provisions in accordance with congressional intent, they must do so
uniformly across statutes.
b. Which Definition? Whether or not courts define attempt
uniformly across statutes, courts operating under a statutory
interpretation analysis should determine which of the common-law
attempt definitions to apply. In so doing, they must be guided by the
182
purposes of the criminal law. Whichever approach they choose,
courts must select from the common-law tests: a proximity approach,
183
a probable desistance approach, or res ipsa loquitur.
Courts should adopt a proximity approach to attempt if they
believe the purpose of punishing an attempt is “to prevent some harm
184
which is foreseen as likely to follow . . . under the circumstances.”
Proximity approaches are well tailored to this purpose because they
do not punish a defendant “until the defendant has come dangerously

180. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987) (reasoning that “[a]ll
in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’” that significant legislative change would have garnered more
substantial congressional comment); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where the construction of legislative language . . . makes
so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as
detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). The
phrase refers to a Sherlock Holmes story in which the detective deduces the villain’s identity
from a watchdog’s silence. See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE (Baker Press
2012).
181. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s use of the word
“endeavor”).
182. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990) (“[I]t [is] more appropriate to
inquire which of the common-law meanings of the term best accords with the overall purposes
of the statute . . . .”); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411–13 (1957) (stating that, if
Congress uses a term with multiple common-law meanings in a criminal statute, the term should
be interpreted according to the purpose of the law and its legislative history).
183. See supra Part I.A. (discussing categories of common-law attempt definitions).
184. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 64–65.
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close to accomplishing the completed crime.” If “the primary
purpose of punishing individuals is to neutralize dangerous
186
individuals and not to deter dangerous acts,”
however, the
proximity approaches are poorly suited to the task. Consider the
187
defendants in Peaslee or Rizzo. From Peaslee and Rizzo’s actions,
one can readily determine that they were “dangerous” individuals.
There is every reason to believe that both men would have carried
out their intended crimes had they not been intercepted by law
enforcement. The ability of such dangerous individuals to evade
conviction represents the greatest weakness of the proximity
approach.
Proximity approaches have one distinct advantage over the other
common-law approaches, and even over the MPC’s substantial step
test: flexibility. Under the dangerous proximity analysis described by
Justice Holmes, one factor for determining an attempt is “the gravity
188
of the crime” attempted.
Given the wide scope of attempt
provisions within the federal law, an ability to tailor the conduct
requirement of attempt crimes to the dangerousness of the predicate
crime could be beneficial. For example, consider the defendant who
unsuccessfully searches for the intended victim of his crime. Should it
matter whether the defendant’s intended crime is a scheme to defraud
189
the victim of money or a scheme to commit sexual abuse of a
190
minor? Judges may well be inclined to make such a distinction.
The courts should not accept the probable desistance approach,
as its infirmities are too great. The justification of the probable
desistance approach is that it bases attempt liability on the
191
dangerousness of the actor. The difficulty of implementation,
192
however, weighs against the use of this standard. Courts would have
to decide whether the test referred to: (1) the specific probability that
a particular defendant would give up his criminal plan; or (2) the
general probability that any person who has gone as far as the

185. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 625.
186. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323.
187. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing common-law proximity doctrines).
188. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (criminalizing mail fraud and including an attempt provision).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012) (criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor or ward and including an
attempt provision).
191. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324–25.
192. See id. (criticizing the probable desistance approach as impractical); LAFAVE, supra
note 10, at 626 (same).
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defendant had would give up their criminal plan. If courts accepted
the first, jurors would be asked to read the mind of an individual
defendant. Given this instruction, jurors might base their decisions on
beliefs that people of a certain race, age, or gender are more likely to
be criminals. If courts accepted the second choice, jurors would have
little basis for their decision, as “there exists no basis for making such
judgments as when the desistance is no longer probable or when the
194
normal citizen would stop.” Further, one may ask whether anyone
who has undertaken a criminal endeavor is likely to voluntarily give
195
up their plan before completion.
The res ipsa loquitur test is well tailored to the goal of punishing
dangerous persons. “[O]nce [an] actor must desist or perform acts
that he realizes would incriminate him . . . in all probability a firmer
196
state of mind exists.” The MPC’s Commentaries illustrate this by
the example of a hunter. He brings “extra supplies to facilitate an
escape in the event he resolves to kill his companion” on his hunting
197
trip; he also brings poison. By bringing extra supplies, he may
merely be thinking about committing murder, but by bringing poison
198
he probably has decided to do so and is therefore more dangerous.
Judges may also favor the res ipsa loquitur test because it is relatively
similar to the test currently used. The “substantial step” test requires
conduct that is strongly corroborative of criminal intent, similar to the
res ipsa loquitur test’s requirement that a defendant’s conduct be
199
completely corroborative of criminal intent.

193. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (criticizing the probable desistance approach as
impractical).
194. Id. (citing Donald Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 CRIM. L.R. 505, 509).
195. See Parker v. State, 113 S.E. 218, 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 1922) (describing that it is a
question of fact for the jury whether the defendant would have “turned away from the
consummation of the crime”). But see Robert H. Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal
Attempt, 3 U. PITT. L. REV. 308, 310 (1937) (“All of us, or most of us, at some time or other
harbor what may be described as criminal intent . . . . Many of us take some steps—often slight
enough in character—to bring the consequences about; but most of us, when we reach a certain
point, desist, and return to our roles as law-abiding citizens.”).
196. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 326 (describing the res ipsa loquitur test as requiring that “the actor’s conduct
unequivocally manifest an intent to commit a crime” (emphasis added)); id. at 330 (“The basic
rationale of the requirement that the actor’s conduct shall strongly corroborate his purpose is, of
course, the same as that underlying the res ipsa loquitur view.”).
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Two weaknesses of the res ipsa loquitur test are the exclusion of
200
confessions and the stringent nature of its act requirement. Because
attempt crimes inherently punish noncriminal activity made criminal
by the defendant’s state of mind, confessions or other statements by
201
the defendant can often play an important role in attempt cases.
Consider “the case of a defendant who goes up to a haystack, fills his
202
pipe, and lights a match.” Due to the strict requirement of an
unequivocal act, those acts alone could not support a conviction of
attempted arson, even if the defendant later confessed his plan to
203
burn the haystack. Judges may find that the highly restrictive nature
of the res ipsa loquitur test, along the total exclusion of confessions, is
inconsistent with attempt law’s goal of incarcerating dangerous actors
and punishing dangerous acts.
Are there any arguments based on statutory interpretation for
interpreting attempt provisions according to the substantial step test?
Moving forward from Mandujano, one plausible argument is that
Congress has now, by its silence, accepted the new judge-made
definition. This theory has the same general justification as the
principle of interpreting undefined statutory terms according to their
common-law meaning: that Congress legislates against the
background of judicial decisions, and can deviate explicitly from those
204
definitions if it desires. This theory poses a number of problems.
First, if this position were to be accepted, it would not be clear when
Congressional silence amounted to acceptance, other than that it
occurred some time after Mandujano. Surely Congress could not be
expected to respond immediately to a single circuit court decision.
How many circuit court decisions are necessary to constitute a “new
common law” that overrides the old? Second, this position is
troublesome because it rests on the notion that the appropriate
response to a serious judicial error is acceptance. This should not only
prove worrisome to those who believe that judges have a duty to
answer legal questions correctly; it should also worry those who see

200. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626–27.
201. See id. at 626–28 (discussing the res ipsa loquitur test and the exclusion of confessions).
202. Id. at 627 n.58 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART
630 (2d ed. 1961)).
203. WILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 630.
204. See Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (referencing “the judicial
presumption that Congress legislates against the background of prior judicial interpretations of
statutes that it uses as models”).
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undelegated judicial lawmaking as a usurpation of the legislature’s
exclusive power to create and define crimes.
c. Incorporation. The statutory interpretation analysis assumes
that courts interpreting attempt provisions engage in statutory
analysis at all. Under theories of “incorporation,” courts are not
engaged in statutory interpretation, but are incorporating concepts of
judge-made law that exist in the ether, separate from statutory text or
205
legislative intent. According to these theories, when legislatures
create statutes they sometimes “incorporate” preexisting bodies of
206
law. A static incorporation analysis is identical to a statutory
interpretation analysis; it involves looking to the state of the common
law as it existed when particular statutory language was drafted and
207
“incorporating” that body of common law by reference.
Under a dynamic incorporation analysis, a statute that references
common-law concepts incorporates not only the boundaries of that
concept as they existed when the statute was enacted, but creates a
“hyperlink” which incorporates by reference any future changes to
208
the common law. Because the judges interpreting the common law
are the same ones changing it, dynamic incorporation is not so much a
method of statutory interpretation as it is a form of legislating
209
delegated to the courts. Therefore, a court analyzing a concept that
it believes has been dynamically incorporated will not look to the
state of the common law as it existed at the time a statute was

205. See generally Johnson, supra note 161 (describing the theory of “dynamic
incorporation” as a form of delegated lawmaking).
206. Id. at 1850.
207. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.02[A], at 29 (5th
ed. 2009) (describing statutory interpretation by incorporation of common law).
208. See Johnson, supra note 161, at 1855–56 (“Just as the content of a hyperlinked website
does not depend on the words or symbols in which the hyperlink is embedded, the content of
the dynamically incorporated body of judge-made law does not depend on the words by which
the incorporation is accomplished.”).
209. Id. at 1854–56; see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1996) (“[F]ederal criminal law should be viewed as a system of
delegated common law-making.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides an explicit example
of statutory language that calls for dynamic incorporation. The rule provides that “[t]he
common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience—
governs a claim of privilege.” FED. R. EVID. 501; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(4) (explicitly
incorporating common-law defenses as “determined by the courts of the United States
according to the principles of common law as they may be interpreted in the light of reason and
experience”).
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enacted, but will look to the current state of the common law and its
210
own policy judgments, informed by “reason and experience.”
Mandujano’s analysis can be best explained by dynamic
incorporation, even if that analysis cannot justify the outcome. The
court discussed federal cases interpreting the meaning of attempt
under § 846, and held that “fundamental agreement” among federal
211
courts justified adopting the substantial step standard. Viewed in
the light of a dynamic incorporation analysis, the Mandujano court’s
reasoning makes sense. Without legislative history or a statutory
definition, the court believed dynamic incorporation was appropriate.
The court did not look to traditional common-law meanings of
attempt because it was dynamically incorporating the concept of
attempt. The Mandujano court perceived that attempt law had
changed or should change, and based its holding on that perception.
212
The First Circuit, in United States v. Dworken, articulated a
rationale for adopting the MPC’s substantial step test that essentially
mirrors the dynamic incorporation analysis. According to the First
Circuit, because attempt has always been left to judicial definition,
the court was free to adopt the definition of attempt that “seem[ed] to
213
[it] to make the most sense.” The court stated that it would be
willing to reconsider the definition of attempt if it were “persuaded
that some other standard would better reflect the purposes of the
criminal law,” and made no mention of legislative intent or of
214
statutory interpretation.
Even accepting dynamic incorporation as the proper analytical
method, Mandujano’s holding was still incorrect on two grounds.
First, it misstated the holdings of the cases on which it claimed to rely.
The cases Mandujano cited for the proposition that a defendant’s
conduct need only “be more than remote preparation” required that
215
a defendant’s conduct advance significantly further than that.
210. Johnson, supra note 161, at 1849–51.
211. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372–76 (5th Cir. 1974).
212. United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1988).
213. Id. at 17 n.4.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376–77. The first case cited by Mandujano on the remote
preparation question, Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1940), rev’d on other
grounds, 116 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1940), quotes an enumeration of the dangerous proximity test.
Gregg, 113 F.2d at 690. In Gregg, the court was analyzing the attempt provision of a statute that
prohibited transportation of liquor across state lines. Id. at 690. The court in Gregg rejected the
defendant-appellant’s arguments because it held that the conduct of transporting liquor across
state lines was a “continuing act not confined in its scope to the single instant of passage across a
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Although many of the attempt cases cited by Mandujano used the
phrase “overt act” to describe the conduct requirement, they
demonstrated a uniform agreement that an “overt act” must advance
216
beyond the conduct required by the substantial step test. If the
Mandujano court was trying to use an attempt definition that had
already been widely accepted by federal courts, it failed to do so.
Although no previous court had adopted the substantial step
test, under dynamic incorporation the court may arguably have been
217
authorized to do so by delegation of lawmaking authority. Even
accepting that a delegated-lawmaking approach is analytically
appropriate for attempt provisions, one must still determine how
much lawmaking authority has been delegated. And even if Congress
delegated to courts the authority to choose between and refine
common-law concepts, there is no reason to believe Congress
delegated the authority to change attempt law entirely. Judge Pierre
Leval has suggested that a court engaged in this type of analysis
should be guided and restricted by “the same considerations that

territorial boundary.” Id. at 691. Therefore, although the defendant was not dangerously
proximate to any state boundary, the defendant was still “dangerously proximate” to the
conduct of interstate transportation of liquor. See id. (“[W]hen he loaded the liquor into his car
and began his journey toward Kansas, . . . he was engaged in an attempt to transport liquor into
Kansas . . . .”).
The holding of the second case, United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950),
provides no indication that the conduct of attempt need only be more than remote preparation.
The court there merely held that the “last proximate act” was not necessary to sustain an
attempt conviction. Coplon, 185 F.2d at 633.
In People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1953), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Morante, 975 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1999), the third case cited by Mandujano for the proposition that a
substantial step must only “be more than remote preparation,” the court held that the
defendants’ conduct was insufficient as a matter of law because their conduct did not amount to
“a direct, unequivocal act done toward the commission of the offense.” Buffum, 256 P.2d at 321.
216. For example, in Wooldridge v. United States, 237 F. 775 (9th Cir. 1916), the defendant
was charged with attempt to commit statutory rape. Wooldridge, 237 F. at 775. The evidence
showed that the defendant had procured the agreement of a sixteen-year-old girl to meet at a
specific place to have intercourse, that he did meet her at that time and place with the intent to
have sexual intercourse with her, but that he was “prevented and intercepted in the execution of
his purpose.” Id. Although this would undoubtedly be sufficient as a matter of law under the
MPC’s definition, which includes “enticing . . . the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the
place contemplated for its commission,” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(b) (1962), the court
held that there was no evidence “of an overt act toward the commission of the crime charged.”
Wooldridge, 237 F. at 779. Wooldridge is discussed in Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 373–74.
217. Johnson, supra note 161, at 1854–57 (“Under dynamic incorporation, the statute’s
command to the courts is not ‘[t]ry to figure out what we would have done in your place’ but,
rather, ‘decide for yourself.’”).
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governed the development of the [common-law] doctrine.” Of
course, in many cases, analyzing such “considerations” will require an
analysis that is essentially identical to a statutory interpretation
analysis, that is, looking to the common law to derive general
principles that are applicable to a particular case.
What were the “considerations” guiding the creation of the
common-law tests? By punishing attempts, rather than only
completed conduct, the common-law attempt doctrines recognized
some of the considerations that justify the MPC’s substantial step
219
220
formulation: deterrence,
retribution, the intervention of law
221
222
enforcement, and the prevention of future crimes. By only
punishing conduct that brings the defendant very close to the end of a
223
particular attempt timeline, and by punishing those attempts to a
224
lesser degree than completed crimes, the common law revealed that
it was also guided by a profound discomfort with the notion of
imposing criminal penalties against someone who had not yet
225
committed the conduct of a substantive offense. If the Mandujano
court felt the same type of restraint described by Judge Leval, it
would not have adopted the substantial step test, which fails to fully
capture the common law’s unwillingness to punish individuals or acts
without a clear demonstration of dangerousness.
Even accepting that the Mandujano court was engaged in
“dynamic incorporation” or “delegated lawmaking” rather than

218. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187,
197 (2004).
219. See Paul R. Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other
Problems of Temporal Individuation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 387–89, nn.36–46 (1986) (analyzing
the claim that attempt law is justified by the goal of deterring attempts, which are themselves
dangerous).
220. See MEEHAN & CURRIE, supra note 1, at 31–33 (explaining that “[a]lmost all countries
allot a greater punishment to the completed crime than to the attempt,” because society is less
retributive toward an individual who attempted a crime than one who committed the crime).
221. See C. HOWARD, CRIMINAL LAW 286 (4th ed. 1982) (“[T]he object of the law of
attempt is to justify the arrest and prosecution without waiting for the defendant to commit the
crime.”).
222. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 490 (stating that “danger[] presented by the actor”
justified punishment of attempts).
223. See supra Part I.A (describing the common-law attempt doctrines, all of which required
a defendant’s conduct to come quite close to the completed crime).
224. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 490 (stating that attempts are to be punished less than
completed crimes).
225. See Skilton, supra note 195, at 309–10 (describing the common law’s unwillingness to
impose sanctions on those engaged in mere preparation).

FISHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/2/2015 1:05 PM

376

[Vol. 65:345

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

226

impermissible judicial definition and expansion of criminal law, its
decision was misguided. By adopting a substantial step test, the
Mandujano court failed to create a rule that was guided by the same
principles that had guided the development of the common law.
III. WHY MANDUJANO’S ERROR MATTERS
This Part will discuss the problems created by Mandujano.
Section A will describe how, by adopting the MPC’s definition of
attempt, courts expanded the scope of attempt liability beyond what
Congress had made criminal. This, in itself, is an injustice that
227
warrants a remedy. Further, adopting the substantial step test has
also caused confusion among courts that have struggled to understand
how to adopt a concept from the MPC, rather than from a statute or
the common law. Section B discusses one instance of this confusion,
as federal courts have had difficulty defining the limits of the
substantial step analysis. Section C considers another area of
doctrinal confusion, wherein courts have struggled to understand
what to make of renunciation, subjecting defendants to the MPC’s
expanded attempt liability without the counterbalance of an
affirmative defense.
A. Separation of Powers
The creation of federal crimes is the exclusive province of
228
Congress, not the courts. Considered against the background of the
common law, Mandujano and its progeny have expanded criminal
liability beyond that created by the legislature. Under common-law
attempt doctrines, certain conduct—like assembling a stack of
combustibles and placing a candle in the room with intent to commit
229
arson—was merely preparation and not subject to criminal liability.
Mandujano took a segment of the legal activity of “preparation” and

226. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is
the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime . . . .”).
227. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity.”); Alex Kozinski, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1877 (1999) (“[W]e are not common law judges; we are judges in an age of
statutes. For us, justice consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature, precisely as
written by the legislature. Unlike common law judges, we have no power to bend the law to
satisfy our own sense of right and wrong.”).
228. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812).
229. See supra Part I.A (describing the conduct covered by common-law attempt crimes).
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230

subjected that segment to criminal penalties. In so doing, the court
231
rewrote attempt law “under the guise of construing it.”
B. Defining Substantial Step
Despite the assertions of circuit courts that they have adopted
232
the MPC’s standards, the extent to which they have done so is
unclear. For example, just one year after Mandujano, the Fifth Circuit
held that a defendant’s acts must, by themselves, be “unique” and
233
“mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature.” These
234
requirements amount to an adoption of the res ipsa loquitur test.
Adopting that test does not merely refine or narrow Mandujano’s
235
holding, it applies a radically different test; however, the court did
not say that it was overturning or narrowing Mandujano. One
explanation could be that the court was not actually referring to the
act requirement of attempt, but rather expressing “a concern with the
need for adequate proof of criminal intent in addition to proof of the
236
act.”
The Eighth Circuit, in the same case in which it adopted the
“substantial step” test, indicated that a defendant’s acts would only
constitute a substantial step if his conduct, when “not interrupted

230. See supra Part II.C (describing Mandujano’s holding and arguing that the case
represented a deviation from common-law attempt doctrines).
231. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 633 (Cal. 1970) (warning against judicial
encroachment upon the legislature’s role of creating criminal offenses).
232. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model Penal
Code (‘MPC’) test . . . .”); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying
Mandujano’s substantial step test); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1985)
(using the “substantial step” test and applying Mandujano); United States v. McFadden, 739
F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) (using the “substantial step” test and discussing section 5.01 and
Mandujano); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[F]ederal courts
have rather uniformly adopted . . . Section 5.01 . . . . We also adopt this standard.”); United
States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Mandujano test);
United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[F]ederal courts have rather
uniformly adopted the standard set forth in Section 5.01 of the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code . . . .”); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that its test
was “derived in large part from the Model Penal Code’s standard”); United States v.
Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Our definition is generally consistent with
and our language is in fact close to the definitions proposed by the . . . Model Penal Code.”).
233. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976).
234. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the res ipsa loquitur test).
235. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–32 (describing how and why the MPC’s test
differed from the common-law tests).
236. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 627.
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237

extraneously” would “result in a crime.” This language appears to
be consistent with the probable desistance approach, as it focuses on
the likelihood that the defendant would have actually completed his
238
crime. The Eighth Circuit cited two pre-Mandujano cases in support
239
of this rule: one described, in part, a probable desistance approach
while the other avoided defining attempts at all and simply reiterated
240
that preparation was insufficient to establish an attempt.
Courts’ vacillation between the substantial step test and more
restrictive common-law tests reflects the confusion inherent in
“adopting” a private source of law like the MPC. That courts do not
even seem to acknowledge that any confusion exists, or that they are
referencing two entirely different standards for the same crime,
reinforces the notion that judges are not expressing disagreement
over how attempt should be defined. These judges are instead
grappling with the aftermath of Mandujano and the problems of
defining offenses according to the MPC.
C. Renunciation
In its definition of criminal attempts, section 5.01 includes an
241
affirmative defense of renunciation. Although courts operating
242
there was
under the common law mentioned the concept,
243
traditionally no renunciation defense at common law. Under the
MPC’s definition, a defendant is entitled to the affirmative defense of
renunciation if “he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting

237. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841–42 (quoting United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1319
(10th Cir. 1979)).
238. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the probable desistance approach).
239. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 842 (citing People v. Miller, 42 P.2d 308, 309 (Cal. 1935)). Miller
required that “[t]here must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, and it must
be in such progress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances
independent of the will of the attempter.” Miller, 42 P.2d at 309 (quoting 1 FRANCIS WHARTON,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 280 (12th ed. 1932)).
240. Id. (citing Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 n.40 (5th Cir. 1967)). Mims stated
that “[p]reparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable fragment of the crime
committed.” Mims, 375 F.2d at 148 n.40 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d
317, 321 (Cal. 1953)).
241. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962).
242. See, e.g., Hamiel v. State, 285 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Wis. 1979) (discussing voluntary
abandonment of an attempt using a test similar to the res ipsa loquitur test).
243. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 642 (“The traditional view as expressed by most
commentators is that abandonment is never a defense to a charge of attempt.”).
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244

a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.” A
“complete and voluntary” renunciation must satisfy two factors: (1) it
must “originate with the actor,” and not be brought about by
circumstances that make the crime more difficult or dangerous to
commit; and (2) it must be “permanent and complete, rather than
245
temporary or contingent.”
The Commentaries describe two policy considerations for
246
adopting the renunciation defense. First is a belief that a “complete
and voluntary” renunciation tends to indicate that the attempter was
247
less dangerous. One purpose of the MPC’s requirement that a
substantial step strongly corroborate criminal intent is to show that
the actor’s criminal purpose was so serious as to indicate that the
248
defendant was dangerous.
The defense of renunciation gives
defendants the opportunity to demonstrate that their criminal intent
249
lacked the seriousness that warrants criminal punishment. Second,
the Commentaries express a belief that the defense of renunciation
would encourage would-be criminals to renounce, “diminishing the
250
risk that the substantive crime will be committed.”
Despite the fact that every federal circuit has held that the
251
MPC’s “substantial step” test defines the act requirement, no circuit
has recognized a renunciation defense. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits
252
have explicitly rejected it.
At one point, it seemed the Eighth Circuit was inclined to
253
recognize renunciation. In United States v. Joyce, the defendant was
254
convicted of, inter alia, one count of attempt to possess cocaine.
Michael Dennis Joyce communicated with a drug dealer who was
255
actually an undercover police officer. The officer told Joyce, located
244. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4).
245. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 358.
246. Id. at 356–62.
247. Id. at 359.
248. Id. at 331.
249. Id. at 359.
250. Id.
251. See supra note 232 (listing cases).
252. United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that a
defendant cannot abandon an attempt once it has been completed.”); United States v. Shelton,
30 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We . . . hold that withdrawal, abandonment and renunciation,
however characterized, do not provide a defense to an attempt crime.”).
253. United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1982).
254. Id. at 839.
255. Id.
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in Oklahoma City, that drugs would be available for purchase in St.
256
Louis. Joyce flew to St. Louis, met an undercover officer posing as a
257
cocaine dealer, and asked to be shown the cocaine. The officer left
the room, and returned with a wrapped package, claiming that it
258
contained cocaine. Joyce refused to produce any money unless the
officer opened the package, and the officer refused to open the
259
package unless Joyce produced his payment. Realizing that the two
had reached an impasse, the officer told Joyce to leave, and Joyce left,
“with no apparent intention of returning at a later time to purchase
260
any cocaine.” Joyce was apprehended as he left his meeting with the
261
officer, and a search of his luggage revealed $22,000 in cash. A jury
convicted Joyce of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to
262
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed Joyce’s conviction,
holding that he had not taken a “substantial step” toward the
263
completion of the crime. A defendant who, like Joyce, travels
interstate with a suitcase full of money, meets with a drug dealer,
expresses a desire to exchange drugs for money, and holds the
cocaine he intends to buy in his hands has taken a substantial step
that is strongly corroborative of his attempt to possess cocaine. Under
the MPC, it is legally sufficient to establish a substantial step if the
defendant possesses “materials to be employed in the commission of
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission,
where such possession . . . serves no lawful purpose of the actor under
264
the circumstances.” Joyce possessed $22,000 in cash near the hotel
room where he intended to use that money to purchase $20,000 worth
265
of cocaine. Although money by itself could serve a lawful purpose
under most circumstances, $22,000 in cash could have served no other
purpose at the hotel. Further, the same rationales that justify
considering other examples of conduct to be substantial steps justify

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 839–40.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 841.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(f) (1962).
Joyce, 693 F.2d at 840.
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finding Joyce’s conduct to be a substantial step. Taken as a whole,
Joyce’s actions are certainly “strongly corroborative” of his intent to
possess cocaine.
The court’s reasoning and language are much easier to
267
understand under a renunciation analysis. The court held that
although unsuccessful or aborted attempts can support an attempt
prosecution, Joyce’s case was different because “generally the
abortion of the attempt occurs because of events beyond the control
268
of the attemptor.” This reasoning does not speak to any test for
finding a substantial step; however, it mirrors the requirement of “a
complete and voluntary renunciation of . . . criminal purpose” for the
269
renunciation defense. If the court was looking for actions which
“negative[d]” the defendant’s dangerousness—a consideration for
renunciation under the MPC—then his eventual refusal to purchase
270
the cocaine would have been relevant. It would have shown that his
criminal intent was insufficiently firm to warrant criminal
punishment. Despite the seeming endorsement of the renunciation
defense in Joyce, the Eighth Circuit effectively overturned that
271
decision in United States v. Young, which held that “a defendant
272
cannot abandon an attempt once it has been completed.”
266. For example, consider section 5.01(2)(a) and (c), which state that “searching for . . . the
contemplated victim of the crime” and “reconnoitering the place contemplated for the
commission of the crime” can amount to a substantial step by themselves. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01(2)(a), (c). Although there is no specific “victim” of possession of cocaine, Joyce did
search out the drug dealer and the cocaine he intended to possess. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 839–40.
Though there is no evidence that Joyce “reconnoiter[ed]” the place where the transaction was
supposed to occur, he went even further by actually entering the hotel room with the drug
dealer. Id. at 840.
267. See Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841–43 (“Whatever intention Joyce had to procure cocaine was
abandoned prior to commission of a necessary and substantial step to effectuate the purchase of
cocaine.”).
268. Id. at 841.
269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (emphasis added).
270. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 359 (describing the negation of an actor’s
dangerousness as a motivating factor behind MPC renunciation).
271. United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2010).
272. Id. at 745. The Eighth Circuit, between the publication of Joyce and Young, decided an
unusual case on renunciation. In United States v. Ball, 22 F.3d 197 (8th Cir. 1994), the
defendants were convicted of entering a bank with intent to commit robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. at 198. The defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on
a renunciation defense, because after the defendants entered the bank with intent to commit a
robbery, they “abandoned or withdrew . . . when they left the bank without pointing a gun or
announcing a stick-up.” Id. at 199. The court held that the renunciation defense has no
application except to attempt crimes. Id. A statute criminalizing the act of entering a bank with
intent to commit a robbery covers similar ground as a statute criminalizing an attempted bank
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The two cases that explicitly rejected the renunciation defense,
273
274
Young and United States v. Shelton, employed similar reasoning.
The two courts did not ask whether the word “attempt” as used in the
statute carried with it an affirmative defense of renunciation. Rather,
275
both courts indicated that the defense of renunciation was logically
impossible. According to both courts, “the attempt crime is complete
with proof of intent together with . . . a substantial step” after which a
defendant “can withdraw only from the commission of the
276
substantive offense” and not the attempt.
That a crime has been “completed” does not logically preclude
the possibility of an affirmative defense. Indeed, the legal question of
an affirmative defense is only relevant if the prosecution can show
that the defendant met all other elements of the crime. Criminal
sanctions can attach in whatever circumstances the law dictates, and
the renunciation defense merely excludes some circumstances from
277
the reach of attempt law. There is no requirement, logical or legal,
that criminal sanctions be imposed regardless of what the defendant
does after satisfying the elements of a crime. Whatever policy reasons
there may be for rejecting the defense of renunciation, the defense
should not be rejected on a mistaken belief that the defense could not
logically exist.
Should courts adopt the renunciation defense? As long as the
courts persist in defining attempts according to the MPC, the answer
is “yes.” As an intuitive matter, it seems unfair to defendants that
courts would expand criminal liability for attempt by adopting section
5.01(1), (2), and (3) from the MPC, but refuse to narrow the scope of
that liability through the affirmative defense in section 5.01(4). As
Justice Felix Frankfurter said, “if a word is obviously transplanted
from another legal source, whether the common law or other

robbery, and is probably based upon similar policy considerations. However, by moving beyond
a simple “attempt” statute and prohibiting specific conduct, Congress demonstrated an intent to
remove questions of the sufficiency of the act or of renunciation from this particular type of
attempt.
273. United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1994).
274. See Young, 613 F.3d at 745–46 (quoting extensively from Shelton).
275. The renunciation defense was characterized as “withdrawal” from the attempt in
Shelton, 30 F.3d at 705, and as “abandonment” of the attempt in Young, 613 F.3d at 743–44.
276. Young, 613 F.3d at 745 (quoting Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706).
277. For further discussion of the logical underpinnings of the renunciation defense and of
the policy arguments in favor of adopting the defense, see Hoeber, supra note 219, at 383–403.

FISHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/2/2015 1:05 PM

DEFINING ATTEMPTS

383

278

legislation, it brings the old soil with it.” The Code’s drafters
believed that there is significantly less justification for imposing
criminal sanctions upon a defendant who takes a “substantial step”
but renounces that attempt, and codified that belief by including a
279
renunciation defense. By refusing to recognize the defense of
renunciation, federal courts have stripped the substantial step test of
a significant piece of its “soil.”
The concerns that weigh against a federal court adopting the
MPC’s substantial step test do not apply in the case of the
renunciation defense. Affirmative defenses are traditionally created
through judicial decisions, and many are still defined solely by the
280
common law. Although the background of adopting the MPC is
itself problematic, there is no corresponding reason for courts to
refuse to adopt the Code’s renunciation defense.
There is no clear legal doctrine governing how courts should
adopt rules from the MPC. This should not be an invitation for courts
to cherry-pick parts of ideas from private sources like the MPC at
will. In fact, many courts have indicated in dicta that they intended to
adopt section 5.01 in its entirety, not that they intended to adopt
281
section 5.01(1), (2), and (3), but not (4).
The problem of
renunciation typifies the confusion caused by deviating from the
normal practice of interpreting common-law language according to
common-law definitions absent clear legislative instructions to the
contrary. Affording defendants the renunciation defense may be the
most fair choice once the substantial step test has already been
adopted because it applies the provisions of section 5.01 that help
defendants as well as those that help prosecutors. However, these
problems only exist because courts have improperly interpreted
attempt statutes, and the proper course of action should be to revert
to a common-law test, rather than simply “completing” the error by
adopting section 5.01 in its entirety.

278. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
537 (1947).
279. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 356–62.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230–38 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing
the common-law “body of doctrine” defining federal self-defense law).
281. E.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model
Penal Code (“MPC”) test for attempt . . . .”); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869
(1st Cir. 1983) (adopting “the standard found in Section 5.01” of the MPC).
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the federal courts’
universal adoption of the MPC’s definition of attempt after
Mandujano is that no court appears to have seriously considered any
282
other path. The absence of judicial opinions or scholarly literature
on this point indicates that few lawyers may be aware that Mandujano
and its progeny could be challenged based on the arguments set forth
here. Defense lawyers should be aware that they could plausibly
argue their clients should benefit from of a more lenient legal
283
standard. But defense lawyers can only be successful if federal
appellate courts are willing to remedy the now-entrenched mistake of
“adopting” the MPC into the federal law. Courts must be willing to
view their role as the one stated by Judge Kozinski: “[W]e are not
common law judges; we are judges in an age of statutes. For us, justice
consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature, precisely as
written by the legislature. Unlike common law judges, we have no
284
power to bend the law to satisfy our own sense of right and wrong.”

282. Research has uncovered only one instance in which a federal circuit court addressed
whether the MPC’s formulation was properly adopted: United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12
(1st Cir. 1988). In Dworken, the court noted that counsel for the defendant only raised the issue
at oral argument, and therefore that it need not have been considered, “especially where, as
here, the issue is one that demands extensive briefing and argument.” Id. at 17 n.2.
283. Although this Note has primarily discussed appellate cases, trial attorneys should be
aware of this issue so that it may be preserved for appeal. If a defendant does not object to a
trial court’s jury instruction, the appellate court can review only for plain error. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 30(d), 52(b). A defendant would have difficulty arguing that the trial court’s error was
“plain” when it was consistent with the current precedent of every circuit.
284. Kozinski, supra note 227, at 1877.

